The introduction of a ‡at tax is supposed to have several advantages. Administration and compliance costs are reduced, as well as incentives for tax evasion. Furthermore, positive employment and growth e¤ects are expected. Despite these advantages, a ‡at rate tax is not very popular in most Western European countries. The most important objection against a ‡at tax states that a ‡at rate tax would be inequitable and unfair. The present paper uses a simulation model based on a unique database of German micro data to provide empirical evidence for the analysis of the equity and e¢ ciency e¤ects as indicators for the political feasibility of ‡at rate tax reforms. Our analysis shows that the selection of the schedule and tax base parameters are crucial for the e¤ects of ‡at tax reforms in terms of equity and e¢ ciency. A ‡at rate tax with a higher basic allowance and a higher single rate has less harmful distributional e¤ects than a ‡at rate tax with low basic allowance and tax rate. Nevertheless, the scenario with the lowest parameter values for basic allowance and tax rate is the only alternative that leads to positive labour supply and signi…cantly positive welfare e¤ects. Both labour supply and static welfare e¤ects, however, are quite small. Although we have derived our results for the case of Germany, we do think that similar patterns would be observed in other countries of Western Europe. If this proves to be correct, it will be hard for ‡at tax reforms to invade the grown-up welfare states of "Old Europe". JEL Codes: D31, D60, H20
Introduction
European welfare states are under pressure because of population ageing and globalisation. The former increases the need for public funds whereas the latter makes tax bases (sources of public funds) more elastic and tends to increase unemployment of low-skilled workers. The complex tax bene…t systems of grown-up welfare states are frequently seen as inappropriate to meet the economic challenges ahead. Therefore, fundamental reforms of the tax system are proposed. The introduction of ‡at rate tax systems is widely seen as a reform which may boost e¢ ciency, employment and growth through simpli…cation and higher incentives. However, these e¢ ciency e¤ects do not come for free. Inequality is likely to increase as a consequence of a ‡at tax reform. This, in e¤ect, questions their chances to gain political support.
For a long period of time, ‡at rate taxes have only been implemented in tax havens like Hong Kong or the Channel Islands. But during the last decade, the ‡at tax idea has been very successful in Eastern Europe. Estonia (1994) , Lithuania (1994) , Latvia (1997) , Russia (2001) , Slovakia (2004) , Ukraine (2004) , Georgia (2005) and Romania (2005) recently adopted ‡at tax systems. 1 So far, this development has not yet reached the grown-up welfare states of "Old Europe". Nevertheless, ‡at rate taxes are high on the political agenda in various countries. This is not only true for other Eastern European countries like for example the Czech Republic, Poland or Slovenia. The idea is also discussed in Western European countries like the Netherlands, Denmark or Germany. If the ‡at tax continues creeping up to the West, geographically, Germany would be the next and the …rst Western country to adopt a ‡at tax. Recently, the council of economic advisors to the ministry of …nance proposed a ‡at rate tax for Germany. 2 Furthermore, the reform proposals of Kirchhof (2003) and Mitschke (2004) , which have been controversially discussed before the election in 2005, chose (almost) ‡at schedules.
In the discussion of the ‡at tax "a notable and troubling feature [...] is that it has been marked more by rhetoric and assertion than by analysis and evidence". 3 As ‡at taxes have not been implemented in Western countries yet, only simulation models are able to provide empirical data for the analysis of reform proposals to satisfy this need for empirical evidence. The aim of this paper is to conduct a comprehensive empirical analysis of the economic shortterm e¤ects for di¤erent ‡at tax reform proposals in terms of both equity and e¢ ciency within the same microeconometric framework. We use a microsimulation model based on a unique database of German micro data to provide empirical evidence for our analysis. We analyse if di¤erent kinds of ‡at rate taxes always yield distributional e¤ects at the expenses of the middle class and if they indeed result in positive e¢ ciency and employment e¤ects. We concentrate on the short-term e¤ects using a static comparison. There might be further e¢ ciency gains from the introduction of a ‡at tax system in the long term but the short term e¤ects will decide the political feasibility of a tax reform. Comparing the results for di¤erent ‡at tax reform scenarios allows us to analyse the e¤ects of the two main schedule parameters -marginal rate and basic allowance -on the results. We quantify the impact of these ‡at tax reform scenarios on the distribution of after tax disposable income, the e¤ective marginal income tax rates faced by di¤erent types of taxpayers, and the supply of labour. Furthermore, we estimate the change in welfare caused by the tax system. As far as we know, this has not been analysed with real mirco data yet. 4 Our analysis is based on a simulation model for the German tax and transfer system (FiFoSiM) using income tax microdata and household survey data. The qualitative results should be of interest to a wider range of countries, especially with a similar structure of the tax bene…t system.
Our analysis yields the following results. A ‡at rate tax reform increases the inequality and reduces the polarisation of the distribution of disposable incomes. Inequality increases less the higher the marginal tax rate and basic allowance are. The e¢ ciency e¤ects are ambiguous and depend on the selection of the ‡at tax parameters. The e¤ective marginal tax rates are decreasing for some taxpayers (especially with high incomes) and increasing for others. The labour supply e¤ects are negative for high marginal rates but positive for scenarios with low parameter values. The welfare analysis shows, that scenarios with low marginal tax rates increase welfare, whereas scenarios with high marginal rates result in negative welfare e¤ects. Thus, the selection of the schedule and tax base parameters have decisive e¤ects on the results in terms of equity and e¢ ciency. Therefore politicians have to evaluate these e¤ects carefully when choosing the parameters of a ‡at tax reform.
The setup of the paper is organised as follows: chapter 2 gives a short review of the ‡at tax and describes our reform scenarios. Chapter 3 contains a short description of our model and the database. Chapter 4 illustrates the distributional e¤ects in terms of inequality, polarisation, winners and losers. Chapter 5 presents the e¢ ciency e¤ects in terms of e¤ective marginal tax rates, labour supply reactions and welfare e¤ects. The concluding chapter 6 confronts the e¤ects on distribution and e¢ ciency of the presented ‡at tax alternatives.
The Flat Tax
Flat rate tax systems may di¤er considerably in their design. In the literal sense a "Flat Tax" is a uniform tax rate on the total tax base. 5 Usually, a ‡at rate personal income tax is regarded as an indirect progressive tax schedule with a basic tax allowance and a uniform marginal tax rate. Reform concepts proposing a ‡at rate tax generally combine the introduction of a new tax schedule with a broadening and simpli…cation of the tax base to make the tax system more transparent (tax rate cut cum base broadening). These proposals aim at a complete coverage of all kinds of incomes. Therefore exemptions are abolished and double taxation is avoided. The latter is of special importance regarding the corporate taxation (capital gains). The most popular ‡at rate tax proposal is the "Flat Tax" of Hall and Rabushka (1995) , which has not been implemented in its pure form yet. This proposal combines a cash ‡ow taxation on business incomes with the same single marginal tax rate on labour income. Real investments are granted an immediate write-o¤, whereas …nancial investments are tax exempt. Therefore, the neutrality of the savings and investment decision is achieved through this S-Base Tax. Our analysis focuses on the …rst two elements of a ‡at tax -the indirect progressive tax schedule and the -as complete as possible -coverage of all types of incomes in the tax base.
The introduction of a ‡at tax with a basic tax allowance, low uniform marginal tax rate and a broad tax base to reform existing tax systems is supposed to have several advantages. Administration and compliance costs are reduced, as well as incentives for legal or illegal tax evasion. 6 Pro…t shifting and the relocation of investments in the international tax competition is avoided. Furthermore, positive employment and growth e¤ects are expected. Moreover, Mirrlees (1971) simulated the optimal tax schedule being close to linearity. Browning and Browning (1985) estimate an increase in labour supply in the US by 5%, whereas Heer and Trede (2003) simulate an incline in employment by 2% in Germany using a macro data CGE model. Cajner et al. (2006) use a CGE model for Slovenia to simulate several tax reform scenarios. They …nd that in general progressive tax systems yield better results in terms of welfare than ‡at tax regimes but some ‡at tax scenarios might perform better in terms of growth and employment. From a theoretical point of view, the investment and employment e¤ects are ambiguous. They depend on the composition of the tax base and the underlying labour market model (c.f. Fuest (2000) ). In incomplete labour markets with collective bargaining and information asymmetries resulting in involuntary unemployment, the e¤ects of lower marginal tax rates on employment are ex ante ambiguous.
Despite these advantages, a ‡at rate tax is not very popular in most Western European countries. The most important objection against a ‡at tax asserts, that a ‡at rate tax would be inequitable and unfair. The eligibility of this allegation depends crucially on the criteria for an equitable burden-sharing. The very reference to the ability-to-pay-principle is not su¢ cient, because this principle does not allow determining an optimal degree of progression or if a tax system should be progressive at all. From a scienti…c point of view it is more distinct to analyse the e¤ects of ‡at tax reforms on the tax burdens of di¤erent groups of tax payers. This analysis is extremely important with regard to the enforceability of such a reform proposal in the political process. Ho and Stiroh (1998) , Dunbar and Pogue (1998) and Ventura (1999) show for the US that high income households are relieved, whereas especially middle income households are burdened by a ‡at tax reform. Altig et al. (2001) conclude that the lowest income households lose through a ‡at tax. In a study for the Netherlands, Caminada and Goudswaard (2001) also derive the result that a ‡at tax would yield redistribution at the expense of the lowest income deciles, whereas the magnitude of these e¤ects is rather small.
We analyse two di¤erent ‡at rate tax reform scenarios which vary in the marginal tax rate and the basic tax allowance. The two combinations (FT 1 and FT 2) are chosen to be revenue neutral in combination with rigid simpli…cation 7 of the German income tax system to broaden the tax base. The premise of revenue neutrality is chosen for a better comparability of the di¤erent scenarios. The column "…scal e¤ects tax schedule" reports the immediate …scal e¤ects when introducing the ‡at rate schedules without broadening the tax base. The combination of simpli…cation and schedule adjustment yield the …scal e¤ects of column "total …scal e¤ects tax". When comparing the ‡at tax scenarios one can state that the short term loss of revenue increases with an increasing marginal tax rate and basic allowance. As the measures to broaden the tax base will strike in medium term the revenue neutral total …scal e¤ects are to be expected only after several years. 7 The simpli…cation bundle consists of the following measures: the abolition of deductibility of commuting costs and of the saver's allowance and the restriction of labour income related expenses to 1000 e, as well as the abolition of allowances for age, single parents, children and deductions for tax accountancy costs, church tax and donations (charitable and for political parties). A detailed analysis of the isolated and combined e¤ects of these measures can be found in Fuest et al. (2006) .
FiFoSiM: Database and Model
Our analysis is based on a behavioural microsimulation model for the German tax and be-ne…t system (FiFoSiM) 8 using income tax and household survey microdata. The approach of FiFoSiM is innovative in so far as it creates a dual database using two microdata sets for Germany: FAST98 and GSOEP. 9 FAST98 is the income tax scienti…c use-…le 1998 (FAST98) containing a 10%-sample of the German federal income tax statistics. 10 FAST98 includes the relevant data from income tax …les of nearly 3 million households in Germany. Our second data source, the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP), is a representative panel study of private households in Germany. 11 In 2003 GSOEP consists of more than 12,000 households with more than 30,000 individuals. A speci…c feature of FiFoSiM is the simultaneous use of both databases allowing for the imputation of missing values or variables in the other dataset.
The layout of FiFoSiM follows several steps: First the database is updated using the static ageing technique 12 which allows controlling for changes in global structural variables and a differentiated adjustment for di¤erent income components of the households. Second, we simulate the current tax system in 2006 using the modi…ed data. The result of this simulation is the benchmark for di¤erent reform scenarios which are also modelled using the modi…ed database.
The modelling of the tax and transfer system uses the technique of microsimulation. 13 Fi-FoSiM computes individual tax payments for each case in the sample considering gross incomes and deductions. The individual results are multiplied by the individual sample weights to extrapolate the …scal e¤ects of the reform with respect to the whole population. After simulating the tax payments and the received bene…ts we can compute the disposable income for each household. Based on these households net incomes we estimate the distributional and the labour supply e¤ects of the analysed tax reforms. A detailed description of the FiFoSiM simulation model can be found in Peichl and Schaefer (2006) .
Distributional e¤ects 4.1 Distribution of disposable income
The introduction of a revenue neutral tax reform always yields winners as well as losers. To analyse the distributional e¤ects of di¤erent reform scenarios we compute di¤erent distributional measures based on household equivalence disposable incomes 14 . The main results are presented in table 2. The …rst column contains the values for the current tax system in 2006 (status quo). In the following rows the changes of the mean disposable income for each decile, the fractions of households winning or losing disposable income 15 and the measures of inequality and polarisation 16 are reported in per cent for each scenario before and after labour supply reactions (LS) 17 . 18 The highest decile is gaining in every ‡at tax scenario, while the middle to high incomes are burdened. In case of a low basic allowance (FT 1) tax simpli…cation strongly burdens the lowest deciles 19 . This leads to redistribution from poor to rich: all other deciles …nance the relief of the 10% richest tax payers. This result is re ‡ected in the sharp increase of the Gini coe¢ cient. The gains for the highest decile are declining while the upper middle class is losing less with an increasing marginal rate and basic allowance. In scenario FT 2 not only the highest but also some of the lower deciles are gaining. When taking the labour supply reactions into account this picture is changed. Especially the lowest deciles gain above average in relative terms. 20 Still, for low parameter values, the highest decile gains the most in absolute terms. In contrast, in scenario FT 2 the highest decile looses after labour supply reactions. Inequality is even reduced in this scenario after labour supply reactions whereas for the …rst scenario the increase in inequality is not as strong as before. 14 We use the new OECD equivalence scale which weights the household head with a factor of 1, household members over the age of 15 with 0.5, and under 15 with 0.3. The households net income is divided by the sum of the individual weights of each member (=equivalence factor) to compute the equivalence weighted household income. 15 Households whose disposable income does not change more than 50 euros in either direction are regarded as "unchanged". 16 Schmidt (2004) creates a polarisation index which in analogy to the Gini index (Lorenz curve) is based on a polarisation curve for better comparability of the results and their interpretations. Generally speaking, polarisation is the occurrence of two antipodes. A rising income polarisation describes the phenomenon of a declining middle class resulting in an increasing gap between rich and poor. The proportion of middle income households is declining while the shares of the poor and the rich are both rising. 17 A detailed analysis of the labour supply e¤ects follows in section 5.2. 18 We've also computed various indicators of poverty and richness. These measures, however, did not di¤er signi…cantly from the status quo values. 19 Households in the lowest decile (and most in the second as well) do not pay taxes in the status quo. Therefore, the broadening of the tax base yields that some of these households start paying taxes and therefore lose disposable income. 20 The high relative changes for the lowest deciles can be explained by the low absolute values for the decile's mean incomes. The polarisation is decreasing for all ‡at tax scenarios before and after labour supply reactions. This decrease in polarisation is surprising at …rst glance, but the result can be explained by the following two e¤ects: The heterogeneity between the two groups decreases because of the higher tax burden for most people above the median income and because of a decrease of the tax liability of some people below the median. The homogeneity within the upper group decreases as well because of the opposite directions of the e¤ects in those deciles. Both e¤ects lead to a decrease in the polarisation index. In other words: the fraction of people with middle incomes is increasing while the fractions of poor and rich people are decreasing due to these reform scenarios. There are less rich people but they have a higher average income.
The ‡at tax scenarios lead to an increasing number of winners and a decreasing number of losers with increasing marginal tax rates (and basic allowance). 21 Because of the large fraction of people losing disposable income, the implementation of a revenue neutral ‡at tax reform proposal with low parameter values in the political process seems unlikely (see Bönke and Corneo (2006) ). For FT 2, however, there are slightly more winners than losers. Therefore, such a reform proposal could be successful in the political process. 21 It might be surprising that after labour supply reactions still a large fractions of households is losing even though the mean income has increased in allmost all deciles. This can be explained by the fact that many household's incomes slightly decreased whereas only few households receive a large increase in disposable income due to positive labour supply reactions. The changes in the distribution of tax payments are much more signi…cant. Obviously, the 10th decile, that pays the biggest part of the overall tax payments, pro…ts in all scenarios. The lower deciles have to pay a lot more taxes in scenarios 1 and 2. The Gini coe¢ cient is decreasing in both scenarios which indicates less redistribution through the income tax system.
Distribution of tax payments

E¢ ciency e¤ects
There are many ways in which a tax reform a¤ects the e¢ ciency of the tax system. In this section, we analyse the e¤ects of the ‡at tax reform scenarios on the e¤ective marginal tax rates, the labour supply decision and the welfare of households.
E¤ective marginal tax rates
In this section, we analyse the e¤ects on the e¤ective marginal income tax rates faced by di¤erent groups of taxpayers. The underlying idea is that the marginal income tax rate a¤ects the labour supply 22 and savings incentives. Therefore, the changes in e¤ective marginal income tax rates may be considered as rough indicators for the distortions caused by the tax system. The introduction of a ‡at rate tax increases the e¤ective marginal tax rates for the lowest deciles and decreases those of the highest deciles. Depending on the combination of marginal rate and allowance marginal tax rates are increasing or decreasing for more or fewer groups resulting in decreasing or increasing incentives. The absolute and relative changes of the e¤ective marginal tax rates also depend on the combinations. Scenario FT 1 with a low marginal tax rate (and basic tax allowance) yield sharp increases in marginal tax rates for the lower to middle deciles while the highest deciles'rates are strongly decreased. This tendency is reduced with an increase in the statutory marginal rate (and allowance). The decrease in the e¤ective marginal tax rate of the highest decile is not as strong as before while the lower to middle deciles'e¤ective rates increase not as strong as before or are even reduced.
Comparing results for the di¤erent scenarios shows that the lower incomes can be compensated for a high marginal tax rate with a high basic tax allowance. The incentives for the highest incomes are the more increasing the lower the marginal rate.
As a …rst conclusion from this section, we can state that because of ambivalent e¤ects the analysis of the e¤ective marginal tax rates does not allow for a clear evaluation of incentive and e¢ ciency e¤ects of these scenarios. Therefore a detailed analysis of the labour supply e¤ects is undertaken in the following section.
Labour supply e¤ects
To analyse the behavioural responses induced by di¤erent tax reform scenarios we simulate the labour supply responses. Following Van Soest (1995) we apply a structural discrete choice household labour supply model. 23 Recent surveys of the empirical labour market literature and di¤erent kinds of labour supply models are for example provided by Heckman (1993) , Blundell and MaCurdy (1999) or Creedy et al. (2002) . A major …nding of this literature is that labour supply responds rather along the extensive than the intensive margin (see also Immervoll et al. (2007) ). Working-hours elasticities are close to zero for men (see Blundell and MaCurdy (1999) ) and women (see Mroz (1987) , Triest (1990) ). In contrast, extensive labour supply responses seem to be much stronger than intensive (Heckman (1993) ), especially particular subgroups (at the bottom of the income distribution) have rather high participation elasticities (see Eissa and Liebman (1996) , Meyer and Rosenbaum (2001) and Immervoll et al. (2007) ).
In the standard continuous model (see Hausman (1985) ), labour supply responds along the intensive margin: an in…nitesimal change of the marginal tax rate changes the working hours only a little, whereas participation responses cannot be analysed within this framework satisfactorily (Blundell and MaCurdy (1999) ). Discrete choice labour supply models allow to analyse both the extensive (participation) and the intensive (hours worked) labour supply decision within the same modelling framework (Blundell and MaCurdy (1999) , Van Soest and Das (2001) and Van Soest et al. (2002) ). The intensive decision depends on the e¤ective marginal tax rate, whereas the extensive participation decision depends on the tax wedge between gross (pre-tax) labour costs and the after-tax net income of workers (see Kleven and Kreiner (2003) ).
The continuous model "appears not to capture the data, in the sense that the number of part-time jobs is strongly overpredicted"(Van Soest (1995)). There seems to be a lack of parttime jobs because of …xed costs of hiring workers or increasing returns to scale of the worker's production. Furthermore, because of …xed costs of working (Cogan (1981) ) individuals are not willing to work below a minimum number of hours. In addition, there are working time regulations that limit the number of possible working hours to a discrete set. Therefore, a discrete choice between distinct categories of working time seems to be more realistic than a continuum of in…nitesimal choices. Using a discrete choice labour supply model has also the advantage to model nonlinear budget constraints as a result of, for example, nonlinear taxes, joint …ling and unemployment bene…ts (see MaCurdy et al. (1990 ), Van Soest (1995 or Blundell and MaCurdy (1999) ). Furthermore, a richer stochastic speci…cation in terms of unobserved wage rates of nonworkers and random preferences can be incorporated into a discrete choice model. The distribution of these labour supply e¤ects di¤ers considerably between the di¤erent groups. Women and male singles decrease their labour supply with an increasing marginal rate and allowance, whereas married men increase it. The reaction of married people can be explained by the German system of joint taxation, which makes it quite attractive for only one of the spouses to work.
The labour supply e¤ects classi…ed into deciles are reported in The sign of the labour supply e¤ects of each decile is inversely related to the changes of the e¤ective marginal tax rates, but not completely determined by these incentive e¤ects. A reduction of the e¤ective marginal tax rate implies increasing incentives but does not necessarily lead to an increase in labour supply. 24 A low marginal tax rate and basic allowance (FT 1) yields a strong increase in the labour supply of the highest decile which compensates the negative e¤ects of the lower deciles. These results change with increasing marginal tax rates and basic allowance. In scenario FT 2 the labour supply reactions of the highest deciles are negative while the low income deciles increase their labour supply. The total e¤ects remain negative but are not as strong as in the case of a low marginal tax rate and basic allowance.
Welfare e¤ects
The computation of welfare measures is another important aspect for the evaluation of e¢ciency e¤ects of tax reforms. Several methods and measures have been developed in the long literature of Welfare Economics. 25 The empirical application of these methods mostly focuses on the ex-post evaluation of consumer demand using time-series data from before and after a tax reform. Creedy and Kalb (2006) propose a method for the ex-ante analysis of the e¤ects of tax reforms on the labour-leisure decision. As far as we know, this method has not been applied in a microsimulation model to real micro data yet. 26 Following this method, we compute the changes in the equivalent variation as a money metric welfare measure based on the microeconometrically estimated utility function of the labour supply model described in the appendix. The equivalent variation EV i for each individual i can be expressed as:
where E i is the expenditure function, p the price (wage) vector and U i the utility level before (superscript 0) and after (1) the reform. The change in the welfare (in terms of the (negative) excess burden) of the individual 4W i can be expressed as
where 4T is the change in tax revenue. Assuming a Utilitarian aggregation function, the overall changes in welfare can be expressed as 4W = X i 4W i : Table 7 presents the estimated aggregate welfare changes for the di¤erent scenarios. For a more comprehensive analysis, the distribution of the welfare changes together with the changes in tax payments before (T 0) and after (T 1) 27 the labour supply e¤ects (LS) for the income deciles is presented.
The overall welfare e¤ects are positive for the ‡at tax with a low marginal tax rate and basic allowance FT 1 but decreasing with increasing tax rate and allowance values and therefore negative for the high marginal tax rate scenario FT 2. The tax revenue increase induced by 25 See Slesnick (1998) for a comprehensive survey. 26 Creedy and Kalb (2006) , chapter 8, present an example with hypothetical data. 27 The scenarios are designed to be revenue neutral before labour supply reactions (sum of T 0). Therefore they are not revenue neutral when taking into account the labour supply reactions (T 1). If the reforms were designed to be revenue neutral after labour supply reactions, di¤erent questions would be analysed. The ex post …scal and e¢ ciency e¤ects, however, would be similar for both scenarios. the simpli…cation measures increases the distortion of the labour-leisure decision and results in negative labour supply reactions. The tax cuts through the schedule adjustments reduce this distortion and increase labour supply. Therefore, the overall welfare e¤ects of the revenueneutral combinations presented here depend on the interaction of tax base and tax schedule. If the labour-leisure distortion is increased, the welfare e¤ects are c.p. negative, if the distortion is decreased the e¤ects are positive. Nevertheless, the change in tax revenue necessary to induce a (relatively small) positive labour supply and welfare e¤ect is rather large. The welfare e¤ects are unequally distributed across the deciles. The highest deciles are by far the ones which are most a¤ected in absolute numbers. They also largely determine the sign of the overall e¤ect in terms of the money metric welfare measure. The di¤erences in the welfare e¤ects can be explained taking into account the distribution of the labour supply e¤ects and the changes in tax payments. The labour supply reactions are the strongest in the deciles showing the largest welfare e¤ects in each scenario and the sign of the labour supply reactions is correlated with the sign of the welfare e¤ects in these deciles. The highest deciles are those paying the largest fraction of the taxes. In the scenarios with low marginal tax rates, the highest deciles are tremendously relieved and therefore labour supply and welfare e¤ects increase in those deciles. These e¤ects decline with increasing marginal rates and become even negative in FT 2. The overall size of the welfare e¤ects, though, is relatively small: it is well below one percent of tax revenue.
Summary and conclusion
In this paper, we have examined the economic e¤ects of di¤erent ‡at tax reform scenarios for Germany in terms of equity and e¢ ciency. The analysis is based on micro data provided by a behavioural microsimulation model for the German tax and bene…t system (FiFoSiM). The main results are:
The labour supply and welfare e¤ects are positive for low marginal tax rates but negative for higher marginal rates and basic allowances.
A ‡at rate tax reform reduces the polarisation of the distribution of after tax disposable income.
The inequality e¤ects (after labour supply e¤ects) and, thus, the political feasibility of the reform, depend on the combination of the tax rate and the allowance.
In general, the e¤ects of a ‡at tax reform di¤er considerably with changes in the marginal tax rate and the basic tax allowance. The e¤ects on distribution and e¢ ciency do not move in the same direction for di¤erent deciles when the ‡at tax parameters (marginal rate and basic allowance) are changed. The richest people increase their labour supply only if the e¤ective marginal tax rate is signi…cantly reduced (FT 1). If this e¤ect is rather small (FT 2), they even decrease their labour supply due to the income e¤ect of the increase in disposable income. The labour leisure decision does not solely depend on income variables. Apparently, decreasing marginal tax rates does not necessarily increase labour supply. The welfare e¤ects correspond to the labour supply e¤ects in most cases. In the highest deciles the welfare e¤ects are the strongest due to the higher absolute changes in both labour supply and tax payments.
The revenue neutral introduction of a ‡at rate tax with the current basic allowance (FT 1) leads, on the one hand, to redistribution in favour of the highest incomes but on the other hand to positive e¢ ciency e¤ects. In contrast, for FT 2 inequality is decreased (when taking labour supply reactions into account) but the e¢ ciency e¤ects in terms of labour supply and welfare are negative. Therefore, our calculations suggest that the ‡at tax scenarios cannot overcome the trade-o¤ between equity and e¢ ciency. Summing up, the e¤ects of a ‡at tax reform do not only depend on the form of the tax schedule (marginal rate and basic allowance) but also on the form of …nancing and simpli…cation of the tax base.
When interpreting these results and especially the e¢ ciency e¤ects, it has to be taken into account that we limit our analysis to static models. However, ‡at rate taxes are also supposed to have positive dynamic e¢ ciency and growth e¤ects. 29 In combination with tax simpli…cation, compliance and administrative costs are reduced, as well as incentives and possibilities for legal or illegal tax evasion. Furthermore, more extreme ‡at tax proposals often demand cuts in government spending and subsidies. These scenarios rather lead to positive employment and growths e¤ects. 30 As a result of these e¤ects an increase in inequality might be acceptable. The question arises whether the scope of increasing growth and employment through personal income tax reforms is su¢ ciently large. The user costs of labour and capital, which play an important role in determining the demand for labour and investment, are rather determined by social security contributions and corporate taxes than by the personal income tax.
Regarding the political feasibility of a ‡at tax reform, the immediate and short-term e¤ects documented in this paper are most likely to be decisive. The main problem of implementing a ‡at rate tax could be to convince a majority of the population that a redistribution in favour of the highest income decile is acceptable. These distributional e¤ects at the expense of the middle class might explain why ‡at rate taxes have not been successful in the political process in Western Europe. Furthermore, it is uncertain whether a tax system that abolishes a large number of exemptions and tax reliefs is politically sustainable. The temptation for politicians to serve special interest groups with special deductions will not easily disappear. Moreover, from a political economy perspective, a broad tax base allows the government to increase revenue with small increases in tax rates. Therefore, narrow tax bases might be disadvantageous for a given amount of tax revenue, nevertheless, they might protect the taxpayers from excess taxation by the government. 31 To conclude, our analysis shows that the selection of the schedule and tax base parameters are crucial for the e¤ects of ‡at tax reforms in terms of equity and e¢ ciency. A ‡at rate tax with a higher basic allowance and a higher single rate has less harmful distributional e¤ects than a ‡at rate tax with low basic allowance and tax rate. Nevertheless, the scenario with the lowest parameter values for basic allowance and tax rate is the only alternative that leads to positive labour supply and signi…cantly positive welfare e¤ects. Both labour supply and static welfare e¤ects, however, are quite small. Although we have derived our results for the case of Germany, we do think that similar patterns would be observed in other countries of Western Europe. Of course, this remains to be shown. If this proves to be correct, it will be hard for ‡at tax reforms to invade the grown-up welfare states of "Old Europe".
A Appendix: Labour supply model
To analyse the behavioural responses induced by the di¤erent tax reform scenarios we simulate their labour supply e¤ects. Following Van Soest (1995) we apply a discrete choice household labour supply model, 32 assuming that the household's head and his partner jointly maximise a household utility function in the arguments leisure of both partners and net income. Household i (i = 1; :::; N ) can choose between a …nite number of combinations (y ij ; lm ij ; lf ij ); where j = 1; :::; J; y ij the net income, lm ij the leisure of the husband and lf ij the leisure of the wife of household i in combination j. Based on our data we choose three working time categories for men (unemployed, employed, overtime) and …ve for women (unemployed, employed, overtime and two part time categories).
We model the following translog 33 household utility function
where x = ln y ij ; ln lm ij ; ln lf ij 0 is the vector of the natural logs of the arguments of the utility function. The elements of x enter the utility function in linear (coe¢ cients = ( 1 ; 2 ; 3 ) 0 ) and in quadratic and gross terms (coe¢ cients A (3 3) = (a ij )). Using control variables z p (p = 1; :::; P ) 34 we control for observed heterogeneity in household preferences by 31 C.f. Brennan and Buchanan (1980) . 32 A detailed description of the FiFoSiM labour supply module can be found in Fuest et al. (2005) . 33 Cf. Christensen et al. (1971) . 34 We use control variables for age, children, region and nationality, which are interacted with the leisure terms in the utility function because variables without variation across alternatives drop out of the estimation in the conditional logit model (see Train (2003) 
where m; n = 1; 2; 3.
Following McFadden (1973) and his concept of random utility maximisation 35 we add a stochastic error term " ij for unobserved factors to the household utility function:
Assuming joint maximisation of the households utility function implies that household i chooses category k if the utility index of category k exceeds the utility index of any other category l 2 f1; :::; Jgnfkg, if U ik > U il . This discrete choice modelling of the labour supply decision uses the probability of i to choose k relative to any other alternative l:
Assuming that " ij are independently and identical distributed across all categories j to an Gumbel (extreme value) distribution, the di¤erence of the utility index between any two categories follows a logistic distribution. This distributional assumption implies that the probability of choosing alternative k 2 f1; :::; Jg for household i can be described by a conditional logit model 36 :
For the maximum likelihood estimation of the coe¢ cients we assume that the hourly wage is constant across the working hour categories and does not depend on the actual working time. 37 For unemployed people we estimate their (possible) hourly wages by using the Heckman correction for sample selection 38 . The household net incomes for each working time category are computed in the microsimulation module of FiFoSiM. 35 Cf. McFadden (1981) , McFadden (1985) and Greene (2003) . 36 McFadden (1973) . Cf. Greene (2003) or Train (2003) for textbook presentations. 37 Cf. Van Soest and Das (2001) . 38 Cf. Heckman (1979) . A detailed description of these estimations can be found in Fuest et al. (2005) .
